In 1986, professional model Russell Christoff was paid $250 to pose
for a photograph to be used in Canada on a label for bricks of coffee.
Sixteen years later, Christoff saw his face on a jar of Taster‟s Choice
instant coffee in the United States and discovered that his image had
been used without his consent on millions of labels sold
internationally for the preceding five years. Christoff filed the
present action for appropriation of his likeness six years after Nestlé
USA, Inc. (Nestlé), began using his image on the Taster‟s Choice label
but less than a year after his discovery.
The trial court applied
a two-year statute of limitations and instructed the jury to determine
under the discovery rule whether Christoff knew or should have known
earlier that Nestlé had used his image. The jury found that Christoff
did not know, and should not reasonably have suspected prior to seeing
the jar, that his image was being used without his consent and awarded
him more than $15 million in damages.
The Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that under the single-publication rule, because
Christoff had not filed his lawsuit within two years after Nestlé first
“published” the label, his cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations unless, on remand, the trier of fact finds that Nestlé had
hindered Christoff‟s discovery of the use of his photograph, or that
the label had been “republished.” We granted review.
We agree
with the Court of Appeal that the judgment must be reversed because the
trial court erroneously ruled that the single-publication rule does not
apply to claims for appropriation of likeness. But we do not agree with
the Court of Appeal that this means that Christoff‟s action necessarily
is barred by the statute of limitations unless he can show on remand
that Nestlé had hindered his discovery of the use of his photograph, or
that the label had been “republished.” The Court of Appeal‟s ruling
presupposes that Nestlé‟s various uses of Christoff‟s likeness,
including its production of the product label for a five-year period,
necessarily constituted a “single publication” within the meaning of
the single-publication rule. Because the parties were prevented by the
trial court‟s erroneous legal ruling from developing a record
concerning whether the single-publication rule applied, we remand the
matter for further proceedings.
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